Written by Nasser Kandil,
Despite the interconnectedness which is made by many people between the movements of the secession and the division of the region entities, and the colonial projects which Israel is not far from, and despite the reverse linkage which other people make between these movements and the historical aspirations of the nations which suffered historically from the persecution due to their identity, and looked for a suitable timing for independence, the experiences which were witnessed by the entities which were created by the external projects that encourage fragmentation, and the local aspirations for the dream of independence and the formation of a state do not seem livable or successful experiences, whether regarding what it seemed at the moment of birth driven by a national anti-western option as the experience of the declaration of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic in the Western Sahara of Morocco, or what was publicly depended on the coordination and the cooperation with Israel as the southern of Sudan, or which its experience was suffered from the lack of resources and population as the Western Sahara, or whose its experience was full of population capacities and natural wealth as the Southern of Sudan.
Those who look at the map of the region will see in its south the southern of Sudan and in its west the Western Sahara, in its north-east the Iraqi Kurdistan and will see the occupied Palestine where the occupation entity is in the middle, and will find that there is a link between the projects on the sides and the project which is in the middle, thus cannot ignore the image of the encircling of the Arab countries with three states that have seceded from their surrounding and link them with one virtual plan. The question which comes immediately into the mind is about the contradiction of the political identities of their governments. Despite the separatist aspect of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, it did not turn into an entity that is affiliated to the West or has any relationship with Israel, but it is still has a good relationship with Algeria and Mauritania, the positions of the two countries are known through their supporting the Palestinian cause, the sticking to the independence from the West, and resisting its projects and its wars in the region, while the Southern of Sudan is boasting of its distinctive relation with Israel, and the Kurdish leaderships which led the secession movement have historical relations with Israel but they do not boast of it publicly as the southern of Sudan.
The course of the experiences of the Western Sahara and the Southern of Sudan declines politically, economically, and morally during the years that followed the declaration of independence. The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic has lost more than three-quarters of the diplomatic recognition which it knew during the declaration, it lived harsh socio – economic conditions despite its limited population, and it does not seem that it is capable of going on so long in the steadfastness. While despite the mineral and oil resources of the Republic of the Southern of Sudan it got involved in conflicts, wars, and coups, so the life of its people was so bad, furthermore, it was classified by the United Nations among the worst countries concerning poverty, health, education ,and the human rights, which means that the size of support for its formation did not grant it the feature of the strategic project for the major countries, however, it puts the support of the secession in the field of the tactic political employment, and it does not grant the other secession projects which the current project of Kurdistan forms an encouraging example, the conditions to last or the actual support, despite all the analyses about its representation as a base for the American and Israeli positioning on the borders of Iran. So it seems a dream rather than a realistic verifiable opportunity.
Despite the similarities between the situation of Iraqi Kurdistan and the Southern of Sudan, the situation of the Iraqi Kurdistan is more difficult and worse than the southern of Sudan, and surely more difficult and worse than the Western Sahara implicitly. The radical difference between Kurdistan and the two experiences of the Western Sahara and the southern of Sudan is the size of readiness to recognize the new state, and the formation of commercial and diplomatic relationships with it in general, and its relationship with the neighboring countries, their position, and the degree of their tension against the formation of the state of secession in particular, in addition to the status of these countries, their influence, and the deterrent reaction which stems from their positions regarding the opportunities of the openness to the state of secession. Sudan as the first concerned country along with the Organization of African Unity as a regional concerned party, and supported by the United Nations were the forefront welcoming parties of the Southern state of secession, while Mauritanian and Algeria which are the closest neighboring countries to the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic were the main supporters of the establishment of the state of secession supported by the Organization of the African Unity as a regional concerned party, and more than eighty countries have taken the lead in recognizing immediately the emerging state. While in the situation of Kurdistan we are in front of closed borders of four important, effective, active, sensitive countries namely Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, they object strongly the formation of the state of separation, knowing that there is no regional linkage or international framework that will dare to deal with the state of secession, since the size of the siege imposed by the neighboring countries is suffocated and existential towards its entity.
The Kurdish separatist movement comes in a context that does not foreshadow of success on one hand, and it will be accompanied by conditions and data more severe than its previous ones, so this makes it mere a project of political suicide.
Translated by Lina Shehadeh,