Written by Nasser Kandil,
Usually the open crises in the countries which have high excitability due to their political geography give the opportunity for one of two choices. The first is to resolve the conflict in favor of an international camp against another one, its indicators emerge quickly; the non-outbreak of the crises. Where the elements of surprise, readiness, and the inadequacy of the necessary preparations for the confrontation on the two local and the external sides of the conflict contribute in that. The second choice is the transformation of these crises into open wound in which the balances of powers are tested, and where the negotiations and the barters are taken place, and thus will lead to balances. When this occurs at a critical moment internationally the crises will roll to the brink of a major war that draws new international equations.
It is clear that the international balance which based on a permanent test of the ability of America of the rapid resolving did not include the development of any local crisis by the opposite camp or the proceeding in it toward turning it into an opposite test or a balance arena. It is clear as well that there is not any opportunity for the resolving due to the US inability to resolve the open files in the ignited arenas from Afghanistan to Iraq, Libya towards Syria, Yemen, and Korea despite the change of tactics and the succession of the US administrations, so the crises remained open, but it is clearer that Syria alone despite its importance, it has conditions that ensure the turn of scale in favor of the camp which is opponent to Washington to proceed in a semi-resolving in most of the Syrian geography, and the inability of the existing attempts to create different background or to change the destination of the military and the field balances as the strikes of the US missiles.
According to the international politics this means the end of the strategic dimension and even the functional dimension of the Syrian war; therefore there will be a need for alternative areas more effective, less costly, and broader opportunities that achieve the same goal in the tests of power and the industry of the negotiation with opponents. This may make of Yemen an appropriate arena for the attraction with Iran in the regional concept, while it grants Korea the opportunity of the rapid movement after latency throughout the years of the war on Syria as a negotiating and mutual understandings arena with China, but Russia which is the first winner in Syria is not involved to be present strongly in the forefront but only as a mediator in the two crises and wars in each of Yemen and Korea. So Turkey will emerge as an alternative arena of the Syrian war arena, where the West led by Washington was awakened that all the Atlantic investment on Turkey is fading, because the non-satisfaction of the Ottoman imperial anticipations of Ankara’s rulers turns them into single player that is difficult to be controlled, and may it becomes an ally to Russia that can have control over the Balkans, the Black Sea, and the Central Asia. Turkey which is surrounded by a Russian- Iranian alliance gets by mutual consent wide roles in the Asian and Balkan depths that it will not dream of in case of the collision with the Russian and the Iranian partners.
Since the coup in Turkey there was a mysterious arena that could be a place for solutions instead of Syria. The Kurdish platform provided by the war in Syria does not change the situation in Syria, but it is useful for the expansion toward the Turkish interior, furthermore, the emerge of the feature of the Muslim Brotherhood of the Turkish regime provided by the war in Syria is no longer useful to change the Syrian balances, but it is useful to instigate the Turkish secularism. It seems that the last referendum in Turkey for reading the fragile balances of the small differences in the opposite forces was not known by Turkey since the rise of the Justice and Development Party as a Western approved project in a way that raises questions about a secular Kurdish alliance that appeared in the referendum and contained half of the Turks, so it became the ally of the West, while the Turkish President is still in the Russian-Iranian cuddling, Astana is an example, it paved the way to the unknown as long as Turkey is on the borders of Russia and Iran not on the borders of America. When the ruling party in the referendum loses the support of three major cities Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir does not that mean something?
The Turkish President will be slow in the positioning on the line of the fruitful settlements in Syria, and he will miss his opportunity and the opportunity of Russia and Iran, so the Turkish interior wound will grow, exaggerate, inflame, and it may it explode. Thus Turkey will be an arena for the mutual attraction before it becomes the debatable player by the major countries.
Translated by Lina Shehadeh,