Governments in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq

Written by Nasser Kandil,

It was not mere a coincidence that is imposed by the constitutional maturities and the deadlines that explain the emergence of new governments this month in each of Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. In Syria which will witness a new government after ten years, i.e. after the parliamentary elections that are imposed by the constitutional maturity it would be possible to control the deadlines and making them at the end of the constitutional terms not in their beginnings, if there was not a political need to accelerate the mission in order to separate between the new government and the unified assumed government as an outcome of the negotiations on one hand, and to impose forming a government that is protected by the parliamentary majority, this government will provide a political legitimate support for the negotiating delegation, and the forming of the opposite partner for representing the advocacy in the unified government when the negotiation in Geneva reaches this point, while the delay to June would create a confusion about the governmental situation which must be changed according to the outcome of the elections, and it will be suspended  waiting for the negotiations which are supposed to be ended after weeks, the waiting here is to weaken the negotiating position of Syria, but the remaining of the current parliament and the government between April and the end of June has caused the weakness of the negotiating delegation in Geneva, but the most important is that all the approach of the Syrian country for the equation of the unified government that comes from the gate of the priority of the war on terrorism, thus the matter has become the center of the partnership between the Syrian country and most of the major powers especially America and Russia.

If the constitutional maturity in Syria is a present factor in the preparation for a new government then the political need and the relation to the settlements are more present, in Iraq nothing imposes constitutionally changing the government, where the title of the popular pressure which caused the governmental change may not end with a final formation, and may wait for the availability of conditions, alliances, and the necessary understandings through the political balances for the birth of a strong government that is able to continue leading the war against ISIS towards the victory before the end of the year, after it became clear that a coherent Iraqi government that is able to mobilize a popular military Iraqi structure can be betted on its effectiveness among the Iraqi various compositions on one hand, and on its ability to bear the burdens of the most cruel round in the war on terrorism on the other hand.

In Yemen, originally there is neither legitimacy nor appointments nor maturities from the constitutional aspect for the virtual president whose reign has ended but he still makes changes, but after the maturity of the necessity to make a negotiation after the abject failure in the two campaigns of Taiz and Sanaa which were led by Saudi Arabia, it became indispensable to enhance the negotiating situation by arrangements for what is after the negotiation, by keeping the roles and distributing the shares between the pillars on which the Saudis depend, which the most important of the them is finding a position for its reliable man in Yemen Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, this Yemeni change is an attempt to put the limits which protect the Saudi interests and influence in Yemen in the process of negotiation as an attempt to protect the possible in the stage of settlement.

The region is moving toward ending the files and curing the wounds despite much of the denial noise which those who stand aside release, those who are not notified from their employers the truth of what is going on but only at the last time, and with the necessary limits to know what they have to do without explanations and without the right of asking questions.

Translated by Lina Shehadeh,