Syria and Turkey… the discussion on accepting Adana Agreement

Written by Nasser Kandil,

Two years ago, it was inconceivable that Syria would have control over the geography which was under its sovereignty and the control of its army in 2011, and that some of the international and regional forces which fought the Syrian country regress and withdraw and some have searched for exits that keep them away from more losses. It is enough to notice how were the positions of America, Turkey, and Israel during a climate of escalation and threat two years ago, and how were the positions of the Kurdish leaderships and the armed groups deployed in Aleppo, Ghouta, the south, and Deir Al Zour including the locations occupied by the Turks and the Gulf people or those belong to ISIS and Al Nusra who formed their civil and military emirates at the expense of the unity and the sovereignty of Syria, and how the  concept of federalism and autonomy has become in the vocabularies of the political solution and its turning into a project of security solution in Aleppo as suggested by the UN envoy Steffan De Mistura.

Now, the image is totally different, the Syrian country is having control on the geography which was under its control in 2011 except the northern strip which is distributed between the Americans and the Kurdish militants on one hand, and the Turks, Al Nusra front, and some groups backed by Turkey on the other hand. It becomes clear that these areas will soon become under the Syrian sovereignty through the American withdrawal and the Kurdish openness to a political solution with the Syrian country on one hand, and on the other hand, through the Turkish involvement in a negotiation with the Syrian country under the title of Adana Agreement which was signed in 1998 to ensure the situation on the borders between Turkey and Syria, the military resolving of Al Nusra front, and the fall of the groups backed by Turkey between either the Turkish political option or the military option as depended against Al Nusra.

There is a call to return to discuss Adana Agreement which some want to link it with its texts that grant the Turks what is called as the right to trace inside the Syrian territories or suggest the Syrian acceptance of ignoring the fate of the Sanjak of Alexandretta. Some consider returning to Adana Agreement as prejudice to the sovereignty and unity of Syria, calling to refuse adopting it as a victory of Syria. Therefore, the correction begins from refusing the assumptions supposed by the agreement. Its agreed definition is a border agreement between Syria and Turkey to regulate the situation across the borders between the two countries before the year 2011. So away from its detailed contents, two facts must be acknowledged. First, it is an agreement that reflects the Syrian sovereignty decision that was taken in circumstances that did not result from war and its consequences as the Turkish violation of the sovereignty of Syria and the threat of its unity, therefore, the acceptance of its provisions is not a cost that must be paid by Syria in exchange for the Turkish regression from its violation and threat, especially because Syria on the eve of the war on it in 2011 did not seek to modify the provisions of the agreement or consider its provisions a prejudice to the sovereignty of Syria and its unity. Second, if there was an ambition   to improve the conditions of practicing the sovereignty and unity then this is legitimate, but it is not related to the equations of the victory of Syria.

In a similar way, Syria is connected across the borders of Golan with the Agreement of Disengagement with Israel signed in 1974. Syria’s position is still mysterious towards that agreement; however, its Israeli acceptance considers recognition of the Syrian victory over the war which Israel was one of its partners and operators since 2011. Therefore, the call to refuse the return to the Agreement of Disengagement forms an illegal moral pressure on Syria. While the Syrian leadership is conducting cleverly the political and military battle on this front with all its complexities, Israel wants to abandon the decision of disengagement and the Israeli commitment to withdraw from Golan. It continues its endless raids on the Syrian territories. This means that when Syria decides to return to the agreement of disengagement after ensuring the concept of its sovereignty and the unity of its territories as before 2011, no one has the right to doubt the validity of its position.

In both cases, the return to the situations before 2011 is an interpretation of the victory on this war, without ignoring the occupation of Turkey of Sanjak of Alexandretta and the occupation of Israel of Golan. But the timing and the tasks of their liberation is a separate issue from the war on which the allies of Syria participate in its confrontation. It can be said that if Syria has the opportunity to open one of two files; the occupation of Golan and the occupation of Sanjak of Alexandretta, it is logical to begin with opening the file of the occupation of Golan, but this will be in accordance with the considerations of the Syrian country not due to moral pressures at a wrong time.

Translated by Lina Shehadeh,