Albinaa’ Newspaper August 14, 2024
Nasser Kandil
Across an area exceeding millions of square kilometers, the sky will be the stage for what millions in the world and region will see, in terms of an unprecedented confrontation by fire between Washington and Tehran, the outcome of which will determine many balances and equations, whether it leads to a great war or creates an impetus to freeze war-related risks and return to the course of negotiations. What is occurring is that Iran is committed to a deterrent response against the entity, on the basis that April’s fiery message was not sufficient to make the entity’s leaders stop from thinking again of playing with Iran, evidenced by a recurrence on their part worse and more insidious, which implied that the deterrence needed should be multiple times stronger than what had occurred in April. From an opposite angle, whether Washington had given the green light to target Iran or not, she is openly committed to do everything in her capacity to spare the entity from the Iranian aims in her deterrent response, transforming the confrontation from its original classification of a confrontation between Iran and the entity into an Iranian-American confrontation.
Neither side is able to tolerate coming out the loser in this confrontation, with the loss having countless implications. Suffice it to say that if Iran loses, it will lose its significant regional stature, with the loss reflecting on other fights such as the American forces remaining or withdrawing from Syria and Iraq, and the future of those two countries, a future not relevant to Iran alone, but has implications and consequences to big international forces which have strategic cooperation relations with Syria, and who are competing with America on a new international formula, namely Russia and China. As for Washington, her loss will mean her inability to keep her forces in Syria and Iraq, handing over deterrence to Iran and Al Mukawama, and a shaking of the principles and foundations of the entity’s strategic security in the region, placing it on a quick path of decline and military disintegration.
It is unknown whether there still exist political mediation efforts to ward off the confrontation or to lower its intensity, with the only doorway a sudden announcement of an agreement which ends the war in Gaza under terms acceptable to Al Mukawama, in a manner requiring an American position thwarting all of Benyamin Netanyahu’s projects, plans, and manipulation of time and negotiations, which is not currently apparent on the horizon. America’s acknowledgement of retreat from defending the entity is more difficult than the choice of placing pressure to achieve an agreement on Gaza, while the admission that operations against her occupation forces in Syria and Iraq will continue, implies an acknowledgement of the need for withdrawal from these two countries, all of which do not appear to be on Washington’s agenda. What the American military amassment in the region and accompanying declarations say is that matters have begun to remove politics away from the field, while in Iran matters appear to be heading in the same direction with the Iranian foreign ministry voiding diplomatic efforts by its statement confirming Iran’s right of response, and her right to determine its deterrent scale, and that the say is now for the battlefield.
It is more likely that Washington’s calculations about the confrontation differ from Tehran’s, even though Washington has confined its mission to face-off and down the largest number of missiles and drones coming from Iran towards Palestine. It appears that American and Iranian minds are focused on making counter-plans, namely how Iran is going to be able to have the largest number of explosive warheads reach the depths of the entity and precisely hit targets, and how Washington is going to prevent Iran from such achievement. This war is one of minds and technologies, where each party appears confident in victory and the achievement of their aims, making the confrontation necessary to determine the final say. This means that we may be in time for a continuous confrontation in the skies for numerous hours, in which Iran reveals what it has not hitherto utilized, and Washington reveals all anti-technologies it has in its arsenal, giving Russia and China close monitoring ability which allows them more knowledge and action, with Iran being the spearhead of an international alliance prohibiting Washington from emerging victorious in the event matters appear to be heading in that direction. At the same time, Al Mukawama forces in the area stand solicitous of engagement in the confrontation with full force to provide the Iranian response the chance for victory, especially with the geographical advantages each element possesses: Iran and Yemen possessing the ability to disperse American and Israeli defenses, and Lebanon having the ability to steer clear of American hindrances.
The issue is not about the Israeli response to the Iranian one, which would amount to an acknowledgement of the success of the Iranian response and the defeat of the American deterrence. An Israeli response in this case would be an exit from admitting defeat aimed at keeping the escalation going, to lead, in turn, to a larger-scale war which would preface a big settlement, or to gradual retreat and a small settlement, which in both cases is a gain for Iran and Al Mukawama forces. The matter is about not necessitating an Israeli response with the American having succeeded in fending off the Iranian explosive warheads, in which case we will be in time for an escalation with strikes of a different nature targeting the entity and prefacing the crossing through land incursion and advancement, with the American hapless in providing aid, and the entity having no ability of facing such challenge. At such a time, the settlement will be different in nature and price to be paid, which have the Americans perhaps taken into account, or perhaps not?
