September 30, 2024
By Nasser Kandil
• The Prime Minister of the occupying entity and their military can boast about a series of successive military and security achievements over the past week. Yet, in the context of war, the key question remains: what is the ‘power-excess’ in deploying this military force? The real measure lies not in the immediate shock, awe, or confusion inflicted upon an enemy, but in the realistic options that power-excess opens up for achieving long-term objectives. The excessive use of power-excess, no matter how dazzling, holds little strategic weight unless it paves the way for practical options that answer the fundamental question in warfare: how does the display of power translate into tangible results?
• The strategic value of armies and their power-excess lies in their ability to open up broader war options, and is measured by the range and scope of the possibilities they unlock. This is where the military’s strategic power emerges – not just in shocking the enemy but in achieving clear goals. In the ongoing Israeli war against Lebanon, the aim is clear: to sever the link between the Lebanese and Gazan fronts. The stated objective is the return of displaced persons, interpreted as the cessation of hostilities on the Lebanese front without regard to Gaza’s future. Achieving this would require not only shocking and destabilising the enemy but also driving them to accept terms that meet this goal. Has the entity succeeded or come close to imposing its will on Hezbollah to sever its connection with Gaza?
• Despite the losses Hezbollah has endured, including the losses in its infrastructure and environment, and the assassination of its Secretary-General, the resistances’ commitment to its bond with Gaza has only intensified – as evident in its announcement of Sayyed Nasrallah martyrdom or in the continuous, escalating attacks on northern occupied Palestine, Hezbollah’s resolve remains steadfast. It is evident that the occupying entity lacks a clear roadmap for using its military’s and security’s power-excess to force Hezbollah into accepting this decoupling, which, in Hezbollah’s narrative, equates to total defeat. Domestically, the strikes against Hezbollah have only bolstered its legitimacy in maintaining this link, and no viable Lebanese political or governmental framework seems likely to help the entity achieve this goal through military operations targeting Hezbollah’s leadership, cadres, and support base.
• The occupying entity has the opportunity to invest the achievements of this intense round of military and security operations it two ways – or pursue both simultaneously: it can escalate the war by expanding its military operations to include Beirut and Lebanon’s service infrastructure – thus shifting from a war against Hezbollah to one against Lebanon as a state and people – or it can pursue further internal pressure. With this option the entity fears losing the support it has garnered for restricting the war to Hezbollah, and its wary that such an escalation could give Hezbollah the pretext to launch a widespread counterattack deep within its territory that reciprocates the targeting of civilians and infrastructure. According to the occupying army’s reports, Hezbollah still has considerable resources for conducting such reciprocal attacks but hesitates to do so – fearing the impact on its environment and structure. However, an expansion of the battlefield risks making it easier to legitimise these actions under the banner of protecting Lebanon and the Lebanese people. It also makes it harder to isolate the Lebanese front from the Gazan front, as indicated by the French-American statement, which underscores concerns over this very scenario.
• The second option is a large-scale ground offensive aimed at forcing Hezbollah to retreat beyond the Litani River, creating a buffer zone for future negotiations. However, this goal was unattainable during the negotiations leading up to the ceasefire and the passing of UN Resolution 1701 after the July 2006 war, and the occupying leadership remains reluctant to pursue this strategy for fear of failure, which could undermine all prior achievements. Despite public pressure in favour of a ground operation, the entity’s military leaders claim readiness but have yet to make the final decision to proceed.
• From Hezbollah’s perspective, the strikes have been severe, targeting both its infrastructure and its support base. However, three key strengths remain intact within the organisation: first, its leadership structure, which is capable of recovery and reorganisation as it has done in the past; second, its combat readiness in the south, which remains nearly as strong as it was before the latest round in the war and: third, its strategic missile capabilities, which Israeli reports suggest remain largely untouched, alongside a tactical missile force that continues to target northern occupied Palestine with increasing intensity.
• After the devastating airstrikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs, resulting in hundreds of civilian deaths, the equation of ‘Beirut for Tel Aviv’ is activated – since the southern suburb is part of Beirut. Beyond merely avenging its leaders, including its Secretary-General, Hezbollah is keen on rebuilding its deterrence which is necessary for maintaining its arms under the banner of protecting Lebanon. Restoring this deterrence doesn’t necessarily mean plunging into an all-out war unless the entity chooses that path and doesn’t open-up to an agreement that halts attacks on the southern suburbs in exchange for a cessation of strikes on Tel Aviv, which can avoid war. Simultaneously, Hezbollah continues its escalating attacks on northern occupied Palestine, aiming to puncture the entity’s public pride over its military successes by revealing that the only changes are the increased missile launches and the swelling number of displaced persons. In the end, there are two solutions to these persistent challenges: a full-scale ground war or an agreement with Gaza. While Hezbollah, favours a ground war and seeks the opportunity to showcase its own counter-narrative to the occupier’s displays of military might, it seems that Hezbollah’s roadmap is clear: push the entity’s public, elated by the military’s achievements, towards demanding a ground invasion, then capitalise on the ensuing failure to trigger protests in Tel Aviv calling for a comprehensive deal with Gaza to end the war on all fronts. Meanwhile, the entity has yet to chart an alternative roadmap.
