The function and goals of Netanyahu’s visit to Muscat

Written by Nasser Kandil,

The reception of the Prime Minster of the occupation entity by the Sultanate of Oman is an unacceptable and condemned normalization, no matter what were the pretexts and justifications. Israel is the only winner of the ongoing normalization process in the Gulf whether in sports, culture, security, or politics. These are fixed facts, but the question is about the significance and the goals of this visit; is it a preparation for a military act against Iran as some think?  Is it a preparation for a similar visit to Saudi Arabia? Is it just an outcome of the relationship with Oman and Netanyahu wanted to make use of it due to the regression of the image of Saudi Arabia which he presented as a reliable ally? Or is if some of which?

Certainly, now it is not the time of the American-Israeli thinking about the war on Iran in the light of the Saudi weakness. Saudi Arabia is the central country in the Gulf and in the Arab official system and without its restoration of its strength it will not be able to make fateful strategic decisions in the Gulf, in addition, when the goal is security and military, logically it must be surrounded with secrecy rather than the show of the visit in which the senior officials of intelligence of the occupation entity participated.

It is certain that the normalization is a cultural and psychological accumulation, and every step in it is an Israeli gain, but the qualitative step on which the American and the Israeli endeavors depend is the normalization and the alliance between Israel and Saudi Arabia, it is a path that has increasingly obstacles despite the secret and the semi-public cooperation. After the new aggravated Saudi dilemma, Saudi Arabia does not seem that it is in a state that can take a step as Israel needs, and the talk about the deal of the century that requires an important Palestinian partner who accepts to abandon Jerusalem seems so far.

It does not seem difficult for Oman since it had previous similar steps as Qatar. The visit of Yitzhak Rabin in 1994 to Muscat and then the visit of Shimon Peres in 1996 say a lot. Many people think that Muscat’s moderation in the issues of the regional disputes comparing with the rest of Gulf countries is the result of the abidance by refusing the normalization. Oman and Qatar want to stand on the compromises line rather than standing on the engagement line. When Qatar lost through its leadership of the Arab Spring that role and played a bigger role, Muscat could replace it in sponsoring the compromises, but there is always an American book of terms for this role, it is a book of terms that includes a prize for Israel.

Israel is in new strategic dilemma, it is unable to wage a war and unable to make compromises and at the same time, the bet on ending the Palestinian cause with the participation of Saudi Arabia under the title of a joint alliance against Iran becomes more difficult. The waiting for the stage of completion of the Saudi developments which is still in its beginning is an Israeli need where Muscat is its gate; therefore, mystery is a need to return to the negotiation when the Saudi opportunity falls. But this is not what is going on, rather it is mere a mobilization of an Omani prize granted to Israel under American request in exchange for granting Muscat the opportunity to sponsor the American-Iranian failure in the light of the prior expected failure of the sanctions and in the light of the Saudi changes, as it is an opportunity to Muscat to lead a negotiation that paves the way for compromise in Yemen during this current Saudi situation.

Israel is the first winner even if it does not have a plan to employ such gain, since Palestine is not the Arab priority and since the Arab interest is canceled from the agendas of the rulers and governments.

Translated by Lina Shehadeh,