by Nasser Kandil
Americans and Israelis know well that the essence of their pressures against “Al Mukawama” revolves around guarantees Washington seeks for Tel Aviv prior to US withdrawal from the area. Such guarantees are related to the future of the “Al Mukawama’s” presence in Syria, along with the future of the legal designation of land and water border lines between Lebanon and Occupied Palestine, as a framework for opening a door for discussions about the future of Israel’s security. They also well know of the “Mukawama’s” superiority in military confrontations and of their own superiority in the economic arena.
From this perspective, the recent Israeli air raid in the vicinity of Damascus Airport resulting in the martyrdom of Ali Muhsin, a “Mukawama” member, gave the “Mukawama” the right of response, based on the still in effect formula set by Hizbullah’s Secretary General Al Sayyed Hassan Nasruallah a year ago. This air raid during the multi-faceted and multi tooled confrontation taking place in the few months before the US Presidential election, has opened the gateway to engagement in the arena in which the “Mukawama” has the superiority, an opportunity she has been waiting for. Why, therefore, should a quick use of this gain in a rapid predetermined response from the “Mukawama” be expected, in the place of capitalizing on such gain before its expenditure?
The state of terror in the body of the Occupation, the decay in its collective identification as a settlement conclave, and its pause of anticipation for the inevitable blow, transform the obscure timing, nature, location, and magnitude of the blow into accumulated interest on the capital placed at the “Mukawama’s” disposal for use at her own discretion.
Confusion in the Israeli army, the beginning signs of which appeared in the recent incident which resulted in the death of an Israeli soldier, is expected to increase as the waiting period (for Hizbullah’s response) goes on. Such an agonizing and deadly prolonged anticipation period will result in mounting political and legal pressures on the Israeli government and its head to answer why they had placed their country in harm’s way as their terror coming from the North intensifies. All that will be accompanied by market stagnation, in addition to the worldwide economic stagnation associated with COVID-19. Why then do some enthusiasts expect a quick response from the Mukawama?
In the next few months of financial, political, and battleground competition, the Mukawama retains the initiative until she decides to spend her gained capital (from the Israeli air raid) after having chosen the nature, type, and magnitude of her response. In the interim, the Israeli army will not dare commit a new stupidity and the financial and political steps taken by the Americans will be more measured. The dosage of the response will be determined by the Mukawama’s evaluation of the political arena and the other arenas of confrontation to determine the payload her military response should carry. The timing of her response will be in line with tactical considerations drawn from the heart of her perception of strategic balances, and the degree of decay in her enemy’s being whose agitation will continue to mount and signs of its weakness will become apparent.
Perhaps a quick open and shut case for the dossier of the border lines which the Americans and Israelis wanted after their certainty about the firm refusal of their past proposals,
and likewise their alternate offers to trade US withdrawal from Syria with the withdrawal of the Mukawama forces and Iran, would become the arenas in which they will learn to make concessions as they prepare themselves for receiving the anticipated slap. Given these considerations, what makes some believe that a rapid response is a sign of strength?
What is certain and constant is that the minutes which intelligently separated the martyrdom of Ali Muhsin in the exercise of his duty from its public announcement, and from the announcement that his martyrdom was the result of the air raid in the vicinity of Damascus Airport, will be long in passing and take as long in their transformation into a battlefield response as the Mukawama Leadership sees fit. This Leadership has drawn the equations of response and of readiness, and said “mission accomplished and over” and “no change or exchange in either.”
How beautiful is the wait for this response which will be equivalent to the surprising shocks the Mukawama meted during the July War on Lebanon coinciding with these days, and the equation of “Look at it as it burns in the sea,” and that of “ To Haifa, to beyond Haifa, and to the beyond of the beyond of Haifa!”